Marital Obligations in Bankruptcy Clarified Spouse’s Duty to Pay Opponent’s Attorney Fees May Be Held Non-Dischargeable in Bankruptcy

From Rebecca L. Reinhardt

Attorney fees ordered to be paid by one spouse on behalf of the other are non-dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, a bankruptcy judge in Central Illinois held recently.

In Johnson v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 2012 WL 2835462 (Bankr. C.D.Ill. 2012), the marital settlement agreement obligated the husband to pay the fees to the wife's divorce attorney, but the husband filed for bankruptcy before doing so.  Seeking to avoid the bankruptcy discharge, the wife's attorney argued to the bankruptcy court that the fees, though payable to him, were in the nature of a domestic support obligation and thus non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), and the bankruptcy court agreed.

The Bankruptcy Code actually has two provisions relevant to the treatment of marital obligations in bankruptcy: § 523(a)(5), excepting from discharge debts "for a domestic support allegation," and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), covering debts "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in [§ 523(a)(5)] that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order" of a court or governmental unit.

In Johnson, the court said that after the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 186) ("BAPCPA"), the distinction between domestic support obligations (§ 523(a)(5)) and other types of obligations arising out of the ending of a marital relationship (§ 523(a)(15)) is of no practical consequence in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy: neither is dischargeable in Chapter 7.  The court went on to state that it was of no consequence that the obligation was owed to the wife's attorney and not to the wife directly.  While 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) defines "domestic support obligation" as used in § 523(a)(5) as a debt "owed to or recoverable by" the spouse or child, courts have not interpreted the statute literally, looking instead to the nature of the debt and not to whom the debt is owed. Johnson followed that trend.

Chapter 13 Different:  However, there is a significant distinction between the dischargeability of debts arising from a divorce or separation in a Chapter 7 and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.

In Chapter 13, to obtain confirmation, plans must provide for payment in full of claims entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).  "Domestic support obligations" are entitled to such priority.  § 507(a)(1)(A).  Further, "domestic support obligations" are excepted from the general discharge granted to debtors upon completion of Chapter 13 plan payments.  11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), 1328(a)(2).  If the debtor's obligation is "domestic support," the debtor must propose to pay it in full through a repayment plan, and the obligation will not be discharged unless it is paid in full. 

However, in Chapter 13, debts arising under § 523(a)(15) are dischargeable if the debtor receives a full-compliance discharge.  In re McCreary, 2009 WL 5215587 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009).  Thus, if the obligation is not a support obligation but arises from a divorce or separation agreement or order, the debtor is only required to pay a required pro rata share of the funds available in the Chapter 13 plan.  The creditor spouse is treated as a general unsecured creditor and, upon successful completion of the plan, any remaining balance is discharged.  In re Rabideau, 2011 WL 165179 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2011).

Thus, the distinction between support and other obligations is significant in Chapter 13 cases.  "Whether a debt is nondischargeable as being in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support . . . is a matter of federal, not state, law."  In re Marriage of Lytle, 105 Ill.App.3d 1095 (1982).  11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation as a debt (1) owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse or child; (2) that is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; (3) that is established by a court order; and (4) that has not been assigned to a governmental entity.  State law is used to ascertain the incidents or nature of the debt to determine whether it fits within the federal exception.

Marriage of Lytle.  The label attached and the language of the decree or underlying agreement are not controlling in determining dischargeability; rather, one must look to the substance of the decree or agreement to determine the essential nature of the obligation.  Marriage of Lytle. 

Thus, courts have held that attorney's fees owed to a former spouse, or the former spouse's attorney, in conjunction with or awarded in the context of a support obligation have met the definition of "domestic support obligation".  See Johnson, discussed above; In re Papi, 427 B.R. 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).

Whereas in Chapter 13 debts under § 523(a)(15) are potentially dischargeable, in Chapter 7 debts arising in the course of a divorce or separation are unqualifiedly non-dischargeable.  In re Harn, 2008 WL 130914 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).  (However, note that §  523(a)(15) was markedly changed by BAPCPA; previously, courts applied a balancing approach to determine whether the debtor could reasonably afford to pay such debts and the resulting harm posed to the creditor spouse in the event of a discharge, and this approach no longer applies.)

Serious Consideration Required:  An individual and his or her attorney involved in settlement of a dissolution action should clearly set forth the intent of the parties and insure that it meets the federal definition for the type of obligation the agreement is attempting to achieve.  Furthermore, the parties should be made aware that particular obligations set forth in the agreement may ultimately be non-dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Hold-harmless agreements have been held nondischargeable in Chapter 7 proceedings per § 523(a)(15), as have agreements to pay mortgage obligations.  See In re Walden, 312 B.R. 187 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2004).

For debtors with significant marital debt, consideration must be given to the benefit afforded in a Chapter 13 case, when selecting under which chapter to file.  In McCreary, discussed above, the bankruptcy court held that a former husband's filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy instead of a Chapter 7 to avoid, among other things, paying the full amount due his former wife under a property settlement was legitimate and not in bad faith.

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Case Law Updates

Omission of Payor's Social Security Number Rendered a Notice to Withhold Invalid.

In Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120405, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, after serving a notice to withhold child support on an obligor's employer and not receiving any support payments, a support recipient sought a penalty against the employer for $100 per day that it failed to comply with the notice pursuant to 750 ILCS 28/35. However, the social security number of the obligor employee was omitted from the notice, so the appellate court held that such omission rendered the notice invalid because it did not comport to the strict requirements of 750 ILCS 28/20, which state that the income withholding notice shallinclude the social security number of the obligor. Because the statute itself is penal in nature against the employer who fails to comply, the recipient must strictly comply with all statutory requirements.

Marital Settlement Agreement Vacated for Unconscionability and Fraud.

In In re Marriage of Callahan, 2013 IL App (1st) 113751, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, a marital settlement agreement (MSA) entered into between a husband who had counsel and a wife who was pro se was vacated because it was deemed unconscionable and procured by fraud two years after the entry of judgment. After 29 years of marriage, the wife was awarded reviewable maintenance of $2,500 per month and the payment of her medical expenses for four years while the husband was awarded the marital residence and a pension worth $1.5 million. The court also found that the husband and his counsel made numerous misrepresentations of material facts at the prove-up regarding the nonmarital character of the residence and the valuation of the pension in comparison to the value of marital debts.

Oral Settlement Agreement Read into the Record on the First Day of Trial Is Valid and Binding on Both Parties.

In In re Marriage of Haller,2012 IL App (5th) 110478, 980 N.E.2d 261, 366 Ill.Dec. 461, on the day the parties were set for trial, they reached an agreement that was read into the record. They were advised of their right to proceed to a trial, but stated that they wished to enter the agreement and testified that they understood its terms and that it would be binding. After the court approved the agreement and entered judgment, and prior to the agreement being presented, the husband brought a motion to set aside the settlement agreement because he did not receive a $50,000 bonus which he anticipated at the time the oral agreement was made. On appeal, the husband argued that agreement was unenforceable because the statutory provisions under which maintenance would terminate were not read into the record; that the parties implicitly agreed that the final written agreement (not the oral agreement) was the actual agreement; and that when one of the parties is dissatisfied with an oral agreement and challenges it before written judgment is entered that he is not bound by the agreement. The appellate court held that the omission of the statutory termination events of maintenance from the record did not change the essential terms of the agreement; that there was no evidence in the record that the parties intended that the written agreement was a condition precedent to the binding effect of the oral agreement; and that the oral agreement was binding on both parties and cannot be disregarded simply because one party has second thoughts.

Severance of Joint Custody and Award of Sole Custody to the Father Appropriate.

The appellate court in In re Marriage of Debra N., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, upheld a trial court's judgment which severed the award of joint custody and awarded sole custody to the father despite the fact that the report under 750 ILCS 5/604(b) opined that sole custody should be awarded to the mother. The evidence was replete with instances in which the mother had engaged in questionable conduct, including filing a removal petition on the grounds that she had an employment opportunity out of state while failing to offer any evidence of such opportunity. She also moved as far away as possible from the father without being in violation of the joint parenting agreement (JPA) and among other things, cancelled her subscription to the "Family Wizard" program. 2013 IL App (1st) 122145 at ¶29. The trial court found that the mother engaged in a pattern of behavior that could potentially alienate the child from her father. The court further opined that the statutory factor regarding the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent weighed heavily in the father's favor.

Award of Maintenance of $200 Per Month for Two Years Was Not an Abuse of Discretion.

In In re Marriage of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, at trial on a petition for dissolution of marriage, the court heard extensive evidence regarding both parties' employment histories, earning capacities, expenses, and marital lifestyle. The court ordered the wife to pay to the husband $200 per month in maintenance for two years. While the husband was disabled, he was not permanently disabled and was able to be employed in some capacity. The husband admitted he was able to leave his house a few days a week to place bets at a dog track. It was uncontroverted that the wife had been the historical breadwinner during the long-term marriage. The parties had extensive debt and had filed for bankruptcy during the marriage while the wife worked full-time and overtime in order to pay the family's bills.

Court's Award of Guideline Child Support When the Parties Had Equal Parenting Time Was an Abuse of Discretion.

In In re Marriage of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, the parties shared equal parenting time of the minor child, and therefore the trial court had two options in determining child support: (1) apportion the percentage of support between the parties or (2) disregard statutory guidelines and consider the factors in 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) and award an alternative figure. The record showed that the court did not review the §505 factors and instead just awarded 20 percent of the payor's net income. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a proper determination of support.

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Telling the McLean County Circuit Clerk of your New Address

Written notice of address changes and name changes must be provided to the McLean County Circuit Clerk whenever there is a change for either the payor or the recipient. A change of address through the Post Office does not change the address on file with the Circuit Clerk and will only reroute the check temporarily. Please be sure to include your date of birth if you are making the change by mail. A Name/Address change form is available in the Circuit Clerk's office or online at the link at the bottom of this page. 

It is CRITICAL that address changes be promptly reported if payments are issued from the State Disbursement Unit (SDU). Only the Circuit Clerk's office can report this change electronically to the SDU. 

If you are concerned about a late payment and your payment comes from the SDU, you may contact them at1-877-225-7077. We suggest you contact the Clerk's office BEFORE contacting the SDU. The McLean County Circuit Clerk can frequently assist you in a more efficient manner and are certainly willing to help you solve any problems you might be experiencing. Please understand that they do not play a managing role in the operation of the SDU. A written affidavit is required by the SDU to stop payment on SDU checks. 

NAME AND ADDRESS CHANGE FORM

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Navigating Juvenile Court in Bloomington Illinois

By 

Bridget L. Schott

In the aftermath of the recession or perhaps just as a way expand ones business, it is likely that many attorneys find themselves taking on cases and clients in areas of law they may previously have been unfamiliar. Juvenile Law, and specifically as it pertains to Abuse and Neglect cases, is often one of those areas. Unfortunately, it can be an area that is quite overwhelming and unique, but in order to vigorously work for your client, there are many tools of the trade one should know. Having a working understanding of this area of law will allow you to hold the Department of Children and Family Services more accountable to your client as well as give your client the best possible chances for returning their child home.

The Juvenile Court Act of 1967 controls and provides the guidelines for the abuse/neglect cases. If your potential client comes to you after protective custody of their child has been taken by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), then there a few things you can expect to have happened which led to that decision, and you will want to be able to explain these to your client. The severity of the implications of DCFS involvement should be stressed to your client from the outset, so that they can understand from the beginning that failure to cooperate could have an end result of their parental rights to their child being terminated.

In a typical case, a hotline report has been called into the DCFS hotline by a mandated reporter, which could include a school employee, child care personnel, medical personnel or law enforcement. That reporter is mandated to make a hotline report if they suspect a child has been abused or neglected, and can include situations where they have observed someone beating a child or hitting a child with an object, or they observe marks on a child's body that do not appear to have been caused by an accident, or where a child discloses that they have been harmed, or if a child appears to be undernourished, is dressed inappropriately for the weather or is young and has been left alone. A child having been born exposed to an illegal drug or a parent's drug use also leads to a hotline call.

Upon receipt of the hotline call, the DCFS Central Registry will have contacted a local DCFS Investigator to conduct an investigation into the allegations of the hotline call. The investigator was likely to have met with the parent who the allegations run against, as well as the named children. Hospital or school staff might also be interviewed and the children would be examined to see if there are present signs of abuse. If the investigator determines that the circumstances are severe enough, he or she will take temporary protective custody of the child or children and remove them from the parent's home. If that route is taken, the next step would be a shelter care hearing, and the parent should be advised to stay in contact with the Investigator. Even if the circumstances do not warrant taking protective custody of the child, the investigator may still find that the hotline report should be "indicated" for neglect or abuse and DCFS would offer services to the parent.

If a shelter care hearing is required, the DCFS investigator will have provided the investigation report to the State's Attorney's Office, who will prepare a petition with charges of abuse or neglect, and file it in the Circuit Court of either the county where the neglect happened or where the child resides. When children are taken into temporary protective custody, your client is entitled to (and the Juvenile Court Act requires) a Temporary Custody Hearing being held within 48 hours to determine whether the child shall be further held in custody.(705 ILCS 405/2-9(1) (West 2010) The petitioner (the State) is required to notify the minor's parent or guardian of the time and place of the hearing. If you have spoken to your potential client prior to this hearing occurring and decided to represent the parent, the shelter care, or Temporary Custody Hearing would be the first opportunity to enter one's appearance.

At the Temporary Custody Hearing, parents are served with petitions in the matter and evidence is presented to the court so a probable cause determination can be made. This can be done through a proffer of reports from DCFS and other agencies or through testimony by the DCFS Investigator. It is proper for the Circuit Court to consider previous indicated reports of abuse and neglect through the DCFS central registry which involve the minor's parent, guardian or custodian. 705 ILCS 405/2-10(2) (West 2010) As an advocate for the respondent parent, the most probable opportunity for persuading a court to deny a shelter care request and place the child back with the respondent parent is through highlighting that there exists no immediate or urgent necessity to remove the child or that DCFS has not documented the reasonable efforts that were made to prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor from the home. An avenue to explore may be why a safety plan was chosen as the desired route instead of protective custody.

You may find that instead of a potential client coming to you the day DCFS takes protective custody of the child, they come to you after the Shelter Care hearing has already taken place. If your client has not attended the hearing and you are within 10 days of the hearing, the Juvenile Court Act allows your client an opportunity for a Rehearing on Temporary Custody, so that they have an opportunity to be heard and understand the reasoning for custody of the children being taken. 705 ILCS 405/2-10(3) (West 2010)

If, despite your best efforts for your client, temporary custody is granted to DCFS, then there are additional requirements that the State and/or DCFS must comply with in the process of advancing toward an adjudicatory hearing. If the Juvenile Court Act requires the State or DCFS to comply with an action or a filing and they fail to do so, then, depending on the infraction, it may be proper and in the best interest of your client to file a motion to dismiss based on that failure, or at least explore a motion to compel the filing. For example, the Juvenile Court Act requires that when DCFS is appointed as the temporary custodian, they "shall file with the court and serve on the parties a parent-child visitation plan, within 10 days, excluding weekends and holidays, after the appointment." 705 ILCS 405/2-10(2) (West 2010) Visitation with the child is such an important thing for your client that you should absolutely insist this statute be adhered to by DCFS. The "shall" in the statute is indicative of the importance placed on it by the legislature. The statute further explains that the frequency, duration and locations of visitation shall be measured by the needs of the child and the family, and not by the convenience of Department personnel.

As counsel for the parent it is your duty to explain to your client that acceptance of services shall not be considered an admission of any of the allegations in the petition. If your client chooses the wise route of engaging in services offered by DCFS to correct conditions that led protective custody to be taken, they should know that the Juvenile Court Act does not allow that information to be used against them at the Adjudicatory hearing. DCFS is obligated to begin offering services at the outset of the case, and establishing the requirements which will be expected out of a parent in order to regain their children, and publishing them in a Client Service Plan. For your client's sake, cooperating in services and following the Client Service Plan would be in their best interest as well, for parents are only entitled to 9 months after the adjudicatory hearing to make progress and efforts toward returning the child home and correcting the conditions that led to the child being taken, before a Termination of Parental Rights petition could be filed. Your client should be encouraged to keep an open line of communication with their caseworker, as this will facilitate the best results toward regaining their child.

The Adjudicatory Hearing is a fancy phrase for the trial on the State's Petition for Wardship based on the abuse or neglect. As all actions under the Juvenile Court Act are civil in nature, the State must prove its case using a preponderance of the evidence standard. Abuse and neglect cases employ some rules of evidence that are quite unique, and many of them can only be found in the caselaw for your specific appellate court district. By statute, there are some areas of juvenile law that constitute prima facie evidence of abuse or neglect, including having a medical diagnosis of battered child syndrome, failure to thrive syndrome, fetal alcohol syndrome or has been a victim of any number of sex crimes. 705 ILCS 2-18(2) (West 2010) Medical records are admissible to the court, as well as any indicated report held by DCFS. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) and (b) (West 2010) As an example of caselaw driving the rules of evidence, the 4th District has ruled that the entire DCFS investigatory file is not admissible for the Circuit Court to consider in its ruling; only the "indicated report" portion of the investigative file is admissible. In re J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, 966 N.E.2d 453. The Juvenile Court Act also requires the proceedings to work on a fairly tight schedule. The Adjudicatory hearing must commence within 90 days of the date of service of process on the parties. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 2010) The time limit is quite strict, and the adjudicatory hearing can only be continued beyond the 90 day mark one time, for up to 30 days, and only if the continuance is consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor and approved by the court. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c)(West 2010) If the case continues beyond that point, it may be in your client's best interests to file a motion to dismiss, and it could likely be granted.

A finding that the State has proven its counts of abuse or neglect at the Adjudicatory Hearing does not end your responsibility in the case. The Dispositional Hearing is equally as important as the Adjudicatory Hearing as it determines whether it is in the best interest for the child to be made a ward of the court or whether it would be safe to return the child to one of the respondent parents with certain conditions. The hearing allows the Court and attorneys to examine the services which will be provided to the respondent parents, and to make suggestions of additions or deletions as required. If the only barrier for your client regaining their child is one of financial circumstances alone, then you should request custody and guardianship to be returned to your client, as financial circumstances alone do not support an unfitness finding. If custody and/or guardianship of the child is granted to DCFS, Permanency Hearings shall follow the Dispositional Hearing every 6 months to assess the parents progress and efforts toward returning the child home. DCFS is also under requirements to the Court to put forth reasonable efforts in providing parents the services they need to regain their child. If your client is not receiving the services they need, you should consider requesting that DCFS has not upheld its end of the bargain. Your representation of your client can end one of two ways, at opposite ends of the spectrum. Your client will either have custody and guardianship of their child restored to them, if they have successfully completed all their requirements, or a Termination of Parental Rights petition will be pursued, and your client may lose all rights to their child. The severity of the implications of these proceedings should be stressed to your client at every step of the process.

In conclusion, the area of abuse and neglect law is rich with opportunities for litigation, but is not an undertaking to be taken lightly. The lives of children and the futures of families weigh on the backs of the attorneys involved. Having a working knowledge of the process of juvenile courts is imperative to your success. Taking on a client in a case like this requires dedication to a potentially years-long court process, but the success of your client regaining their children can be quite rewarding.

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

New Parenting Coordination Rule in Bloomington Illinois Divorces

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT RULE 120

Effective January 1, 2013.

D. Parenting Coordination in Dissolution and Family Cases (McLean County)

In an effort to provide the citizens of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit with an expeditious and expense saving alternative to traditional litigation in the resolution of high conflict custody and visitation cases, a program of Parenting Coordination is hereby established in McLean County.

1. Appointment - The Court may appoint a parenting coordinator when it finds the following:

a. The parties failed to adequately cooperate and communicate with regard to issues involving their children, or have been unable to implement a parenting plan or parenting schedule;

b. Mediation has not been successful or has been determined by the judge to be inappropriate; or

c. The appointment of a parenting coordinator is in the best interests of the child or children involved in the proceedings.

Notwithstanding the above, the court may appoint a parenting coordinator by agreement of the parties.

2. Qualification - The parenting coordinator shall possess the Minimum Qualifications of Matrimonial and Family Dispute Mediators which have been established by the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.

3. Confidentiality - Communications with the parenting coordinator shall not be confidential, except that upon the agreement of both parties and the parenting coordinator, the court may deem all or any specific part of the communications with the parenting coordinator to be confidential, if such designation appears to be in the best interests of the children.

4. Duties:

a. The parenting coordinator shall educate, mediate, monitor court orders and make recommendations to the court as necessary. In addition, the parenting coordinator may recommend approaches that will reduce conflict between parents and reduce unnecessary stress for the children.

b. The parenting coordinator may monitor parental behaviors and mediate disputes concerning parenting issues and report any allegations of noncompliance to the court, if necessary.

c. The parenting coordinator shall recommend outside resources as needed, such as random drug screens, parenting classes and psychotherapy.

d. The parenting coordinator may recommend detailed guidelines or rules for communication between parents.

e. The parenting coordinator shall maintain communication among all parties by serving, if necessary, as a conduit for information.

f.  The parenting coordinator may meet with the parties, the children, and significant others jointly or separately. The parenting coordinator shall determine if the appointments shall be joint or separate.

g. Each parent should direct any disagreements or concerns regarding the children to the parenting coordinator.

h. The parenting coordinator shall work with both parents to attempt to resolve the conflict and, if necessary, shall recommend an appropriate resolution to the parents.

i.  The parenting coordinator shall not have any decision-making authority which is the sole province of the court.

j.  The parenting coordinator shall not serve as a custody evaluator in any proceeding involving one or more parties for whom the parenting coordinator has provided parenting coordination services.

k. The parenting coordinator shall not be permitted to give a recommendation or opinion concerning the ultimate issue of fact, law, or mixed issue of fact and law as to child custody, primary physical residence, or visitation. Recommendations or opinions on lesser issues, as stated above, may be conveyed by the parenting coordinator to the parents and the court.

l.  No parenting coordinator shall be held liable for civil damages for any act or omission in the scope of the parenting coordinator's employment or function, unless such person acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the rights, safety or property of another.

5. Expenses of the Parties – Expenses of the Parent Coordinator shall be borne by the parties and shall not be assessed against or paid for by McLean County.

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Bloomington Legal Newsletter: McLean County Docket

You can see what court cases are coming up in the next 14 days by visiting the following site: http://www.mcleancountyil.gov/index.aspx?NID=540

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Child Support Maintenance Fee Payment in McLean County Child Support Cases

Child Support Records Maintenance Annual Fee

In child support and maintenance cases, Illinois statute 705 ILCS 105/27.1a (bb)(4) authorizes the circuit clerk to collect an annual fee of $36 "…from the person [payer] making payment for maintaining child support records and the processing of support orders to the State of Illinois KIDS system and the recording of payments issued by the State Disbursement Unit for the official record of the Court." 

This annual clerk's fee is in addition to and separate from amounts ordered to be paid as maintenance or child support, and is used by the circuit clerk to maintain child support orders and record all payments issued by the State Disbursement Unit for the official record of the Court. 

Each year the circuit clerk's office sends reminder notices to the last known address of each payer. 

Failure to pay your annual clerk's fee may affect your credit rating. 

You may make your annual clerk's fee payment using your credit card. 

Online Payments
To pay ONLINE you will need the following information in order to make a payment: 

·         Case #

·         Dollar Amount You Are Paying

·         A Valid MasterCard, Visa, Discover or American Express Card

*A convenience fee of 3.5% of the payment or $3.50 minimum will be added to the amount of fees due for this service. Government Payment Services (GPS) is an independent company that charges this fee for its services. The Court and Circuit Clerk's office receives no part of the convenience fee. 

Pay your maintenance fee online.

 

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Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206